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INTRODUCTION 
 
he non-profit sector usually called the third sector is growing due to the increase in demand for the 
kind of services that these organizations traditionally provided, such as relief aid, daycare, education 
and hospital services. Governments also increased support for them because the services they 
delivered are collective in nature. They yield benefits that are not restricted to the donors or clients. 
  
Non profit firms differ fundamentally from for profit firms in that non-profits are not by their definition 
allowed to distribute profits to any owner or stockholder. The US Congress exempted tax from non-profit 
organizations (NPOs) on the basis of public welfare theory; the theory being that NPOs perform services that the 
government would otherwise have to provide in their absence; therefore, any loss of revenue resulting from that tax 
exemptions is more than offset by shifting the financial burden for providing those services from the federal treasury 
to tax exempt organizations.  
 
 Some cynics would say that NPOs exist and expand because they enjoy favorable tax exemptions (Bennett 
and Dilorenzo 1989).  Although most of the non-profit groups are exempt from corporate income tax, some non-profit 
firms like AAA automobile clubs and Blue-Cross Blue-Shields have the same tax status as for profit firms. Others also 
argue that governments grant exemptions to have some control over the activities that these organizations are 
involved. 
 
 Tax exemptions for non-profit service organizations make sense theoretically since they provide a benefit the 
state does not adequately perform and hence they lessen the burden on the public purse. Tax exemptions also allow 
the government to encourage certain activities of a public nature without actually accepting responsibility for them-
especially when there is no public consensus that the state should take these functions (e.g. support for religious 
education). This paper tries to present the economic rationale of non-profit firms. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows: section 2 presents non-profit organization in an international perspective. Section 3 highlights the economic 
theory of non-profits.  Section 4 develops a limited managerial discretionary model of non-profit firms. Section 5 is a 
brief discussion of the politics of donations, while section 6 concludes and summarizes the main points of the paper. 
 
NPO’S IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 According to Adam Smith, the secular exercise of charity was an expression of humanitarian sympathy, 
involving both a feeling for other individuals and an ability to picture oneself in their place. Hence, non-profit service 
institutions in the early modern period came to be seen as expression of humanitarian concern as well as a means to 
maintain the social system. They headed off or relieved social tensions in society so as to basically preserve a 
differentiation among economic groups and thus maintain the status quo. Non-profit service organizations enhanced 
societal stability by serving as instruments of social control. 
 
 The agendas of many American non-profits don’t always coincide exactly with those of their private and 
governmental donors. Although the primary motive of many private sponsors is relief-oriented and most responsive to 
addressing short term crises (hunger, sickness, homelessness, flood and droughts), the goals of private voluntary 
organizations (PVOs) are somewhat different and geared to developmental objectives such as income generation, 
training, education, public health, and community development. A principal-agent problem arises because PVOs are 
interested in prolonging and maintaining their activities while the short term crises are temporary in nature (Eastley 
and O’Hara 1983a).   
T 
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 Many non-profits are also coming to define their development objectives in political rather than economic 
terms.  A considerable part of the American non-profit sector that engage in overseas aid is clearly promoting more 
than charitable goals abroad that are not often upper most in the minds of its private and governmental donors. They 
also support groups in the third world countries and advocate programs that are different from and sometimes opposed 
to strategies endorsed by government policymakers in their home countries. An example is the American PVOs 
currently working in Cuba.  
 
 Some non-profits also contributed to the stability of oppressive governments and serve the interest of those in 
power. The social services they provided to low income sectors relieved the respective governments from taking care 
of groups not part of their support base. Moreover, PVOs are staffed by middle class opponents of the regime. They 
thus channel the energies of the dissidents into constructive gap-filling functions that at least indirectly enhanced 
regime stability. If such dissidents did not have the outlets, they might have tempted to search for more radical and 
violent modes of expressing their dissatisfaction with regime policies.  They serve some of the immediate interests of 
governments and businesses, even in situations when they are pursuing policies in clear opposition to the established 
order (caring for the persecuted for authoritarian regimes; working in areas favorable to guerillas, or serving the need 
of the poor who are disenchanted with public bureaucracies in one party states). They help placate working class 
sectors and give them a sense of hope that the system is malleable and responsive to their needs. 
 
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE NON-PROFITS 
 
Non-Profits Exist Because Of The Following Reasons: 
 
Asymmetric Information 
 
This phenomenon arises when the seller has access to more information than the buyer. If the donations are 
made to a for-profit firm, owners and managers will behave so as to maximize profits. There is an incentive to spend 
as little as possible if the risk of being caught is small. For-profit firms will take advantage of their superior 
information relative to consumers and donors who cannot enforce contracts economically. When monitoring is costly 
for consumers, the non-profit firm is often more efficient. They are more trustworthy because they have different 
incentives and non-profits develop where trustworthiness is important.  
 
Henry Hausmann (1980) has argued that the core purpose of the non-profit sector is to operate in those areas 
where consumers (buyers of goods and services, and contributors to charity) have no way to police producers by 
ordinary contractual devices—e.g., if the possibility of cheating to increase profits is greater due to the absence of 
effective market competition for a certain commodity, or if the service is to be delivered to a far-off place so that 
donors don’t see the beneficiaries. 
 
In these situations donors may be willing to trust non-profits, because profit maximizing managers would 
have an incentive to downgrade quality, but this incentive may be weakened in non-profits by the non-distribution 
constraint.  The basic idea is that if managers cannot benefit financially by receiving profits they will be less likely to 
cheat consumers, therefore non-profits are more trustworthy. While the non-distribution constraint makes non-profits 
more trustworthy and gives some protection to consumers, it also makes them less efficient. If no one has a property 
right in the residual, no one has an incentive to keep the organization free from waste.  So, if the monitoring cost is not 
exorbitant, the greater efficiency of the for-profit may be preferred to the trustworthiness of the non-profits. 
 
Thin Markets 
 
Burton Weisbrod (1978) stressed the comparative advantage of non-profit organizations vis-à-vis 
government in performing certain needed public functions. He believes that non-profits support collective 
consumption goods for which there is not yet a demand from the majority of the citizens or for which a majority of 
citizens are prepared to pay in taxation only in amounts that a minority considers inadequate. In these markets the 
demand for the service is so small that no commercial firm could make a profit selling it and because of the subsidies 
which artificially lower costs, NPOs can serve such a market. They can produce goods with lower cost than 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – February 2007                                                     Volume 5, Number 2 
 75 
government or private for-profit firms, especially for labor. They benefit from voluntary donations of time as well as 
money. The non-profit firms have also the opportunity to produce slightly different consumer tastes due to religious, 
cultural, geographical and ethnic differences. 
 
Unsatisfied Demand 
 
The decision of which public goods are provided, is determined through politics. Some people will desire 
more than the amount chosen by the median voter, but the government is limited by the democratic constraint that 
permits it to support only what it believes the majority wants or would approve. Those unsatisfied with the level of 
public goods provision can resort to the NPOs. The under-satisfied demand for collective type goods is a 
governmental failure analogous to private market failures.  That is, the combined willingness of a part of the 
population to pay for some additional collective goods exceed the incremental cost of providing them and yet the 
government, responding to majoritarian interest does not provide them. 
 
 Non-profits are substitutes for government in providing quasi-public goods. They can charge fee for services, 
so the government’s share of total cost is reduced when responsibility is delegated to them. More can be served for the 
same public expenditure.
1
  
 
A LIMITED MANAGERIAL DISCRETIONARY MODEL OF NON-PROFITS 
 
 Non-profits are believed to be like governmental organizations, in being restricted in the use of any surplus 
they generate. In reality, non-profits are not subject to all the constraints that are commonly believed to exist. Most 
notably they are not restricted in the amount of profits they may make, only on what they may do with the profits-
essentially being constrained to use them to purchase more resources for the organization. Neither are non-profits 
prohibited from engaging in activities, commercial or other, that are totally unrelated to the purpose of which they 
were granted exemption from the corporate income tax. 
 
 Whether in the for-profit or non-profit sector, individuals can be expected to try to enhance their own self-
interest. Since managers of non-profit organizations cannot enhance their own self-interest by increasing profits, they 
are likely to seek alternative goals, such as the prestige associated with having large staff and office emoluments. 
Managers of many NPOs enrich themselves at the expense of their organization and their patrons. They may receive 
excessive salaries, personal services and amenities paid out of organization funds. Also businesses owned by the 
managers may receive generous contracts for goods and services, and friends and relatives might be given patronage 
jobs. 
 
 There is also a huge incentive to expand the operations of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Excess revenues are held internally (is not distributed to shareholders) and may be used by management for 
perquisites. Thus, the growth-oriented appetite of bureaucrats are encouraged by non-distributive characteristics of the 
NGOs.
2
 For profits firms are also expansionary when there is a separation of management and control, but competitive 
markets limit such behavior. 
 
The Model 
 
 The managerial discretionary model which arises from the idea that the manager of a non-profit organization 
operates so as to maximize his utility subject to a zero profit distribution can explain the behavior of non-profit 
organizations. 
 
Let us assume that a non-profit firm supports both education and research. In this firm, the utility of the 
manager is a positive function of the amount of research and education provided. 
 
                                                 
1 See Rose-Ackerman (1986) for a detailed explanation of the theory of “unsatisfied demand.” 
2 See Niskanen (1971) for a detailed analysis of the growth of bureaucracy. 
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Um = f(R, E), δU/ δR > 0, δU/ δE > 0, where R = research and E = education.  
 
Let us assume that a non-profit firm produces a public good like education. As the following diagram shows, 
the manager will choose levels of research and education (E
*
, R
*
) that maximize his utility, given the constraint that 
his chosen bundle must lie somewhere on the zero-profit line. Non-profit managers enjoy greater discretion than their 
counterparts in the for-profit sector. They can use their discretion to influence the selection of inputs and the choice of 
output. Employees and staff of non-profit institutions have also a stake in retaining the non-profit firm which may 
offer them greater control, financial remuneration, and protection from competition than would for-profit firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
A Limited Managerial Discretionary Model Of Non-Profits With A Public Choice Twist 
 
In this model, the firm provides the product by using donations from individuals or from the government. 
The manager derives utility from the perks associated with the provision of the good but not from the good itself. 
 
 Um = u [P(E), E], δU/δP > 0, δU/δE < 0, and P =f(E), where P is the amount of perks which depends on the 
amount of education (E) provided. 
 
δU/δE = δU/δP * δP/δE + δU/δE = 0 , or  δU/δP * δP/δE  = δU/δE. This is the manger’s first-order condition. 
The element in the left-side of the equation is the marginal benefit of perks associated with providing education. The 
elements on the right hand side of the equation is the opportunity cost of providing education.  
 
Let us now look at the utility function of the donor.  Ud = u [E(C), C], δU/δE > 0, δU/δC < 0; where Ud is the 
utility of donors and C is the amount of contributions given. The donors derive utility from education; and the amount 
of education is also a function of the contributions. 
 
δU/δC = δU/δE * δE/δC + δU/δC = 0, or  δU/δE * δE/δC  = δU/δC. This is the donor’s first-order condition. 
This equation characterizes the equilibrium of the donor at where the marginal benefit of donating is equal to the 
marginal cost of donations. 
 
R
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The implicit function theorem allows that E
*
 = e (C). This is the reply function of the manager and C
*
= c (E), 
which is the reaction function of the donors. At the Nash equilibrium: E
**
 = e (C
*
); and C
* 
= c (E
**
). As the diagaram 
below indicates, the utility-maximizing level of education is E
**
, and the utility-maximizing level of contributions 
associated with this level of education is C
**
. There is also a diminishing marginal utility associated with the provision 
of education. As the diagram below indicates the maximum amount of education provided by the non-profit firms is 
E
**
.  Initially, the amount of education provided increases with the amount of contributions from donors, however, 
after a certain level the marginal utility of an additional unit of education becomes zero. 
 
Likewise, the manager receives no additional contributions from donors beyond the utility-maximizing level 
of education. The maximum amount of contributions from donor will be C
**
 regardless of the amount of education he 
provides. Therefore, the E = e (C) line becomes vertical and backward-pending after E
**
. Similarly, the C
 
= c (E) 
becomes horizontal after the equilibrium level of education.  
 
 
 
 
THE POLITICS OF DONATIONS AND THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM 
 
 The motivation for charitable giving is rooted not in altruism but in self-interest. Enlightened individuals 
explicitly recognize that some small sacrifice might be necessary if the ultimate self-interest is adequately to be 
served. For example, that corporations make contributions simply reflects the fact that corporate management 
recognize that the long-term welfare of the business depends, among other things on the health of the environment of 
which they are part. Many of the charitably wealthy are also involved in politics. The giving practices of most donors 
are related to their political beliefs and involvement. They give so as to grow and serve them better in the future. 
 
 If the private non-profit institutions are to correct governmental failures that created unsatisfied demand; they 
must overcome the free-rider problem. Non-profits have some instruments to deal with this problem: social pressure 
and subsidy. Many people pay non-profits because they have been socialized to believe that it is desirable and the 
right thing to do.  
 
 Donations are also tax deductible. This deductibility stimulates giving because it reduces after-tax cost to the 
donor. Tax-subsidy policies encourage high demanders to reveal their true preferences. Whenever donations are 
deducted from taxes, tax revenue is reduced. In effect, taxpayers will reveal their greater willingness to pay for the 
collective good by donating. The subsidy is understandable insofar as these are taxpayers with lower but positive 
demands for collective goods; they would benefit if the high demanders increase their contributions. Tax subsidies 
therefore represent, in effect, contributions from low demanders to stimulate the high demanders to contribute. 
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When governments delegate the production of some public goods rather than producing itself, NPOs create 
or encourage political pressure on policymakers to provide the services that these organizations are engaged in 
producing it.
3
 One of the ways this comes about is overemphasizing the importance of their functions through media 
outlets. CARE, an American voluntary organization erroneously claimed that 1.5 million refuges lived in Somalia, 
while the actual number was one-third of that number.
4
 The politicians respond to these pressures positively, because 
these organizations can easily charge fees for services that reduce the government’s share of the total cost and this in 
turn will reduce the pressure on politicians to deliver. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This paper tries to shed light on the economics of non-profit firms. It presents a limited managerial 
discretionary model of non-profits to indicate that the functions of the non-profits are not devoid of self-interest. The 
model shows that non-profits are not that different than for-profit firm except that they are constrained by the zero-
profit condition associated with non-profits. Nevertheless, the managers of non-profit are self-interested utility-
maximizers like their counterparts in for-profit firms. The limited role that they can play is clear from the analysis 
above. If non-profit organizations perform a useful role, they must provide outputs that cannot be provided profitably 
by private enterprises. It must be the case that the lure of profit doesn’t lead to a socially efficient allocation of 
resources when there are socially valuable forms of outputs that are not rewarded financially----either because they are 
costly to buyers to evaluate or because they go to persons with little ability to pay. 
 
 Non-profit organizations operate under different rules and regulations than private, profit seeking firms. They 
are granted special privileges that give them significant advantages in the market place. They are exempt from federal, 
state and local taxation and from many regulations; and they often have preferences in obtaining government grants 
and contracts. These exemptions and privileges reduce the production costs for non-profits and give them an edge 
over their private competitors. For profit firms are penalized even further to the extent that they have borne the cost of 
the subsidies in the form of higher taxes. In many cases, existing profit seeking firms have been driven from the 
market or have suffered economic losses and new firms have been discouraged from entering markets in which non-
profits operate 
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